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WHAT IS THE NBA? 
NADELLE GROSSMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
The National Basketball Association's (NBA) organizational structure is cu-
rious.  While courts at times refer to the NBA as a joint venture, and at other 
times as a single entity, their analyses are conducted not for state organization 
law purposes, but to assess the NBA’s compliance with federal antitrust law.  
Commentators, too, consistently address the NBA’s organizational structure 
only under antitrust law and not state organization law.  As I argue, given the 
different purposes of these two legal regimes—antitrust law to protect consum-
ers through preserving competition, and state organization law to ensure man-
agers are faithful to the business purpose and to create a default structure among 
owners and managers—conclusions about the NBA’s organizational structure 
for purposes of compliance with antitrust law do not control the analysis of the 
NBA’s structure for purposes of state organization law.  
To fill the gap in case law and commentary, this article analyzes the NBA’s 
organizational form under state organization law.  This analysis is important 
because the NBA’s organizational form impacts the rights and duties of the 
member team-owners of the NBA.  If, for example, the NBA is a joint venture 
partnership under state organization law—that is, an association of team owners 
who have come together to pursue a limited scope business for profit—then, by 
default, its members would owe fiduciary duties to the other members and any 
member could seek judicial expulsion of a recalcitrant member. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Any mistakes are my own.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Los Angeles (L.A.) Clippers’ owner Donald Sterling’s racist remarks 
were made public, many urged the other National Basketball Association 
(NBA) team-owners to expel Sterling under the provision of the NBA Consti-
tution that gives NBA member team-owners the right on a three-quarter vote to 
expel a fellow member.1  However, the existence of that right was questionable, 
as none of the events that triggered this expulsion right clearly applied.2   
Ultimately, the probate court presiding over the Sterling family trust that 
held the Clippers found that Rochelle Sterling, Donald Sterling’s ex-wife, could 
remove Donald Sterling as co-trustee from the trust and sell the team.3  The 
matter was, thus, resolved without the NBA team-owners having to force such 
a sale.  However, mysteriously absent from the public outcry and calls for action 
was any discussion about whether Donald Sterling breached fiduciary duties 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Greg Botelho et al., NBA Commissioner Bans Clippers Owner Sterling, Pushes to ‘Force 
a Sale’ of Team, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/29/us/clippers-sterling-scandal/ (last updated 
Apr. 29, 2014); Kevin Trahan, How NBA Owners Can Force Donald Sterling to Sell the Los Angeles 
Clippers, SB NATION (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2014/4/29/5665502/donald-ster-
ling-suspension-la-clippers-sale-adam-silver; see also NBA, CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE 
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, at art. 13 (2012) [hereinafter NBA CONSTITUTION]. 
2 See Botelho et al., supra note 1; Trahan, supra note 1; see also NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 
1, para. 13. 
3 See Eric Kelsey, Sterling's Last Bid to Halt L.A. Clippers Sale Blocked by Court, REUTERS (Aug. 
13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/14/us-nba-clippers-idUSKBN0GD29H20140814. 
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owed to the NBA by making racist remarks, which clearly went against the best 
interests of the NBA.  Moreover, no one questioned whether an individual team-
owner might have sought the judicial expulsion of Sterling apart from any right 
of expulsion set out in the NBA Constitution.  However, such duties and rights 
might exist as a matter of state law, if the NBA were a partnership.4 
In fact, for an organization that has been around for sixty-eight years,5 the 
NBA’s structure is surprisingly opaque.  On one hand, the relationship among 
the members of the NBA is clearly contractual.  The NBA’s own constitution 
describes the NBA as a “contract among the Members.”6 
On the other hand, the NBA is more than just a contract among its members.  
The NBA Constitution even describes the NBA as an “[a]ssociation.”7  An as-
sociation is an organization in which people unite to pursue a common purpose.8  
If the purpose of the association is commercial in nature—a pursuit of profits 
through business—and has not been created through any other explicit organi-
zational form, then the association is a partnership.9  If the purpose is to pursue 
a charitable or other nonprofit purpose, then the association is a nonprofit unin-
corporated association, or NUA.10  Either way, an association is not merely a 
contractual relationship, and it triggers the application of specialized rules. 
Some courts have characterized the NBA’s structure.  For example, the 
Ninth Circuit described the NBA as a New York joint venture.11  A joint venture 
is a for-profit business formed to pursue a specific purpose.12  In contrast, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the NBA looked more like a “single entity” than a joint 
venture. 13  However, both of these decisions came in the context of challenges 
to the NBA’s compliance with federal antitrust laws.14  Given the different pur-
poses behind antitrust law and state organizational law—the former to protect 
                                                          
4 See discussion infra Part IV. 
5 See generally Leonard Koppett, The NBA–1946: A New League, NBA (Dec. 7, 2007), 
http://www.nba.com/heritageweek2007/newleague_071207.htmlhtml. 
6 See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 2. 
7 See id. at art. 1. 
8See BLACK’S  LAW DICTIONARY 148 (10th ed. 2014) (defining an association as the “gathering of 
people for a common purpose” or “[a]n unincorporated organization that is not a legal entity separate 
from the persons who compose it”). 
9 See infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
11 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1987). 
12 See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
13 See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat. Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996). 
14 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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consumers through preserving competition,15 and the latter to ensure managers 
are faithful to the business owners and to create a default structure16—conclu-
sions about the NBA’s structure for antitrust law compliance purposes do not 
control the analysis for state organization law purposes. 
Yet, it is essential to determine what the NBA’s structure is for purposes of 
state organization law because of the consequences that might flow from that 
structure.  Thus, this article considers how to legally categorize the NBA for 
purposes of state organization law.   
Importantly, the cooperative nature of NBA team-owners’ profit-seeking 
and the absence of any other explicit organizational form suggest that the NBA 
is a partnership.  As a partnership, team-owners would owe the NBA and the 
other members fiduciary duties.17  These include the duty to act in the best in-
terests of the NBA.18  In the case of Donald Sterling, clearly his conduct was 
not in the best interests of the NBA or the professional sport of basketball, as 
his racist remarks reflected negatively on the sport and on the league.  Moreover, 
in a partnership, each partner, by default, has a right to seek a judicial expulsion 
of a fellow partner who makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on business 
with that partner.19  Here, Sterling’s conduct made it not reasonably practicable 
to carry on partnership business with him, for the other members could no longer 
trust or cooperate with such an offensive person.  As Michael Jordan, NBA Hall-
of-Famer and owner of the Charlotte Hornets, expressed after Sterling’s com-
ments were revealed, “‘[a]s an owner, I'm obviously disgusted that a fellow 
team owner could hold such sickening and offensive views.’”20  This expulsion 
right would exist apart from the members’ collective right to vote to expel an-
other member under the NBA Constitution. 
It is odd that the NBA’s organizational structure remains shrouded in mys-
tery given the NBA’s outsized role in our society and economy.  This article 
fills that void by analyzing the NBA’s organizational structure under the two 
potential frameworks that apply to it—partnership law and NUA law.  As this 
article explains, if neither of these legal schemes applies to the NBA, then, by 
                                                          
15 See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 173–74 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
19 See discussion infra Part III.B and accompanying text. 
20 ESPN.com News Services, Magic, MJ Weigh in on Sterling, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/los-ange-
les/nba/story/_/id/10848070/michael-jordan-magic-johnson-lash-donald-sterling-purported-comments 
(last updated Apr. 27, 2014). 
GROSSMAN FINAL FORMATTED  1/23/2015  11:20 AM 
2014] WHAT IS THE NBA?  105 
 
 
 
default, contract law governs the relationships by and among the team owners.  
The following is the organizational structure of the rest of this article: 
First, Part II provides an overview of the NBA’s structure.  That discussion 
emphasizes the nature of the relationship by and among the team owners as well 
as their purposes for associating. 
Next, Part III explains the two potential legal structures that fit the NBA—
partnership and NUA.  That discussion also explains that contract law governs 
if the NBA is neither a partnership nor an NUA.  It explains the relationship 
between partnership law and NUA law, on the one hand, and contract law on 
the other. 
Then, Part IV analyzes the NBA under these alternative structures.  First, it 
explains why conclusions about the NBA’s organizational structure for pur-
poses of antitrust law do not control that analysis under state organization law.  
Next, it explains why New York law governs the organizational law analysis.  
Finally, the discussion explains why the NBA is best described as a partnership.  
Alternatively, it explains why the NBA is an NUA. 
Finally, Part V reviews key consequences that flow from the NBA’s organ-
izational structure, focusing specifically on the impact of that conclusion on sit-
uations such as that involving Donald Sterling. 
II. NBA STRUCTURE 
The NBA is the national body organized to “operate a league consisting of 
professional basketball teams . . . .”21  The NBA league currently consists of 
thirty teams.22   
The NBA has not been incorporated, formed as a limited partnership or lim-
ited liability company, or organized through any other organizational form by 
making a filing with a Secretary of State.  Rather, it is constituted through two 
private agreements—its Constitution and Bylaws.23 
By and large, the NBA Constitution sets out the governance structure of the 
NBA, including the rights and responsibilities of the team owners, the board of 
                                                          
21 NBA Constitution, supra note 1, art. 2. 
22 See FAN RELATIONS FAQ, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/help/fan_rela-
tions_faq.html#fanfaq14 (last visited Nov. 23, 2014). 
23 Ashby Jones, NBA’s Decision Against Clippers’ Owner: Is it Legal?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 
29, 2014, 7:11 pm), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/04/29/nbas-decision-against-clippers-owner-is-it-
legal/.  See generally NBA Constitution, supra note 1. 
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governors, and the Commissioner.24  The NBA Bylaws, in contrast, lay out the 
framework for the operation of the NBA, including player requirements.25 
The NBA Constitution provides that it and the “By-laws constitute[] a con-
tract among the Members of the Association.”26  Still, as Part III explains, this 
language does not preclude a finding that the NBA is a partnership or a NUA, 
depending on the purpose for which the NBA is operated.27  In fact, partnerships 
and NUAs are themselves creatures of contract.28 
According to its Constitution, the NBA is not operated for profit.29  This is 
consistent with the NBA Constitution’s principles of organization, which state 
that “[t]his Association is organized to operate a league consisting of profes-
sional basketball teams, each of which shall be operated by a Member of the 
Association.”30  In other words, the NBA Constitution declares a non-commer-
cial purpose.   
Despite this, the NBA is not tax-exempt.31  Potentially, the NBA has not 
elected to be treated as a tax-exempt organization because it actually earns a 
profit.  However, the NBA could have chosen to not be treated as a tax-exempt 
entity for reasons not tied to its generation of profits, such as the fact that as a 
for-profit, it need not publicly file tax reports.32 
A broader view of the NBA’s financial arrangements, though, calls into 
question whether the NBA is in fact a non-profit.  First, while not every team 
                                                          
24 See generally NBA Constitution, supra note 1. 
25 See generally id. 
26 Id. at art. 2.   
27 See discussion infra Part III. 
28 See discussion infra Part III. 
29 NBA Constitution, supra note 1, art. 2. 
30 See id. 
31 David Van Den Berg, NFL’s Tax Exemption Faces Scrutiny, TAX ANALYSTS (Nov. 25, 2013), 
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Arti-
cles/F0E1DC440C69E6A785257C2E006AEE33?OpenDocument.  The fact that the NBA is not tax-
exempt was verified by searching the IRS database of Form 990s, which tax-exempt organizations must 
file.  See EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS SELECT CHECK, Internal Revenue Service, 
http://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2014); see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012) (specifically 
exempting “professional football leagues” but making no specific exemption for other professional 
sports leagues or associations); Kristi Dosh, Examining NFL’s Tax-Exempt Status, ESPN (June 4, 
2013), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9342479/examining-nfl-tax-exempt-status-challenged-us-sen-
ator-tom-coburn (noting that “the NBA has never been tax exempt”).  
32 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Privacy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 806–
12 (2012) (discussing federal disclosure requirements). 
GROSSMAN FINAL FORMATTED  1/23/2015  11:20 AM 
2014] WHAT IS THE NBA?  107 
 
 
 
generates a profit every year, NBA teams clearly generate profits for their own-
ers.33  In fact, the public discourse around NBA teams involves much discussion 
about team profitability.  For example, as Steve Ballmer stated at the time of his 
purchase of the L.A. Clippers from the Sterlings earlier this year, “‘[t]here’s real 
earnings in this business.  There’s real upside opportunity.  So compared to the 
things I looked at in tech, this was a reasonable purchase and it’s one I'm really 
excited about.’”34  
Making an investment in a professional basketball team also gives its owner 
a sense of personal satisfaction.  As Ballmer also stated, “I'm really excited 
about the product.  I love it.  I've been to over a hundred basketball games in the 
last year, and that's just high school games.”35  Yet a love for the sport of bas-
ketball does not distinguish Ballmer or any other team-owner from entrepre-
neurs, who also have passion for the businesses that they start.36  In other words, 
having passion for one’s business does not indicate a non-profit motive. 
There are three primary sources of NBA team revenues; one is gate re-
ceipts.37  The other two primary sources of team revenues stem from contracts 
entered into by the NBA on behalf of all of the teams.  First, the NBA, on behalf 
of the teams, generates revenues from granting the right to nationally and inter-
nationally broadcast games to radio, television, and cable networks.38  The NBA 
teams equally share these revenues.39  Second, the NBA—or more specifically, 
                                                          
33 See Kristi Dosh, NBA Jersey Ads Could Push Teams to a Profit, ESPN (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/2362/nba-jersey-ads-could-push-teams-to-a-profit 
(stating that in the 2011–2012 season, eighteen teams were profitable); Chris Smith, The NBA’s Most 
and Least Profitable Teams, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/01/23/the-nbas-most-and-least-profitable-teams/ (noting 
that twenty-one teams made a profit in the 2011–12 season).  There may not be agreement on which 
teams are profitable as not all information needed to make this calculation is disclosed to the public.  
34 Arash Markazi, Steve Ballmer New Clippers Owner, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/los-ange-
les/nba/story/_/id/11343259/steve-ballmer-officially-new-owner-los-angeles-clippers (last updated 
Aug. 13, 2014). 
35 Id. 
36 See Dave Lavinsky, Starting a Small Business: Passion is Key, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davelavinsky/2013/11/14/starting-a-small-business-passion-is-key/ (not-
ing “how important passion is when starting a small business or any venture”). 
37 According to Forbes, the L.A. Clippers’ gate receipts for 2013 were $41 million, while its total 
revenues were $128 million.  See Los Angeles Clippers¸ FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/teams/los-
angeles-clippers/ (last updated Jan. 2014).  Thus, approximately one-third of the L.A. Clippers’ reve-
nues in 2014 came from gate receipts. 
38 See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1340 (N.D. Ill. 
1991). 
39 Id. 
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NBA Properties Inc., a separate entity owned by the NBA teams—generates 
revenues from the grant of exclusive licenses to merchandise team names, in-
signias, and other similar intellectual property.40  The teams also equally share 
these merchandising royalties.41 
In addition to the sharing of broadcasting and merchandising revenues, the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the NBA and the NBA Play-
ers Association—the union representing the NBA players—provides for reve-
nue sharing among teams.42  This revenue sharing is designed to financially 
equalize teams.43  One primary way teams are financially equalized under the 
CBA is through a luxury tax.44  That is, every team that exceeds a maximum 
team salary cap must pay the NBA a tax in the amount of that excess.45  Those 
tax proceeds are then either used by the NBA or shared by non-tax-paying 
teams.46  This and other revenue-sharing devices set out in the CBA are designed 
to maintain competitive balance in the league.47 
Even where a team does not generate significant annual profits for its own-
ers, owning a NBA team is a profitable enterprise.  This is apparent from the 
Sterlings’ sale of the L.A. Clippers.  Since 2006, the Clippers have not generated 
an annual operating income of more than $15 million.48  Yet the Sterlings made 
a hefty sum when they sold the Clippers for $2 billion in 2014.49 
                                                          
40 See id. at 1339. 
41 Id. at 1340. 
42 See NBA, NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, at art. VII(a)(8) (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter 
CBA] available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2011. 
43 See Larry Coon, 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement, LARRY COON’S NBA SALARY CAP 
FAQ, at Questions 1, 24, http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
44 See CBA, supra note 42, art. VII, § 12. See also Coon, supra note 43, at Question 24. 
45 See Coon, supra note 43, at Question 21. 
46 See id. at Question 22.  For a thoughtful discussion of the 2011 changes to the revenue-sharing 
provisions of the CBA, and why the increase in the luxury tax rate has not led to a more equalized 
distribution of revenues, see Matthew J. Parlow, Lessons from the NBA Lockout: Union Democracy, 
Public Support, and the Folly of the National Basketball Players Association, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 10–
12 (2014). 
47 Coon, supra note 43, at Questions 1, 24. 
48 See Los Angeles Clippers, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/teams/los-angeles-clippers/ (last up-
dated Jan. 2014) (showing that since 2006, the L.A. Clippers have not generated more than $15.7 mil-
lion in operating income). 
49 See Kelsey, supra note 3 (“Sterling will still profit from the sale, pocketing the $2 billion along 
with his wife.”).  While some news accounts report that the Sterlings are making a profit in the amount 
of the full purchase price on the sale, obviously they only profit to the extent the purchase price exceeds 
the price they paid for the team plus any additional capital contributions they made and any debt owed 
by the team. 
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In terms of governance, the NBA Constitution creates a board of gover-
nors.50  The governors on that board “have the general supervision of the affairs 
of the Association . . . .”51  Thus, the board of governors is charged with general 
oversight responsibilities.  This is similar to the role of a board of directors in a 
business corporation, which board is charged with overseeing the business and 
affairs of the corporation.52  While the NBA is not a corporation, it is useful to 
draw an analogy to the corporate form, for the corporate form is a familiar legal 
organizational form with a hierarchical management structure somewhat similar 
to that of the NBA. 
Each NBA governor is selected by a member.53  The term “member” gen-
erally refers to a team-owner. More precisely, a member is a person or entity 
that has been granted the rights, privileges, and benefits to organize and operate 
a professional basketball team to play in the league operated by the NBA.54 
Since members that are entities must act through agents, the NBA Consti-
tution declares that “an action on behalf of a Member by any of its Owners, 
employees, officers, directors, managers, agents or representatives, or its Gov-
ernor or Alternate Governors, shall be the action of a Member.”55  In other 
words, the NBA Constitution designates who acts on behalf of an organizational 
member for purposes of NBA action.  This statement establishes the power of 
virtually any agent or other representative of, as well as any governor selected 
by, an organizational member to bind that organization.  On the other hand, an 
organizational owner would certainly have its own internal approval processes 
for taking action as a member in the NBA, and a person acting without such 
approval would be acting wrongfully within that organization.  Moreover, if the 
NBA were aware of a person purporting to act on behalf of an organizational 
member knowing that person in fact did not have authority to act, it is doubtful 
the NBA could rely on this provision in the NBA Constitution to protect its 
reliance on that person’s action.56 
                                                          
50 NBA Constitution, supra note 1, at art. 18(a). 
51 Id. 
52 EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS & DIRECTORS: 
RIGHTS, DUTIES & LIABILITIES § 1:2 (2013). 
53 NBA Constitution, supra note 1, at art. 18(b). 
54 Id. at Interpretation, Definition of “Member.” 
55 Id. at Interpretation (a)(8). 
56 Such knowledge would remove the person’s apparent authority.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. c (1958). 
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The governor election process is unlike the director election process in cor-
porations, where all shareholders vote on the election of directors.57  In the 
NBA, in contrast, each member selects its own governor to the board of gover-
nors.58  The other members do not vote on or otherwise approve of any other 
member’s selected governor.59  Moreover, a member may replace a governor 
selected by that member at will.60  Thus, the board of governors is essentially a 
body comprised of the representatives selected by the controlling owners of 
NBA teams. 
Likely because of the governor selection process, and the power each mem-
ber has to appoint and remove its selected governor at will, each governor is 
described in the NBA Constitution as an agent of the member who selected that 
person with authority to bind that member for purposes of NBA action.61  In 
contrast, a director of a corporation, when acting in that capacity, is not individ-
ually an agent of the shareholder nominating that director or an agent of any 
other shareholder.62  Rather, the directors act together as a body in representing 
the interests of shareholders.63 
Still, in the NBA, a governor “may be removed with substantial cause by a 
                                                          
57 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, chap. 1 (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 7.20 (2002).  This need 
not always be the case. For instance, a shareholder may negotiate to vote as a separate series for one or 
more directors.  5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 2026 (2011).  Still, that shareholder would likely not elect all directors.  Moreover, 
in privately-held corporations, through private voting arrangements, shareholders often agree which 
shareholders have the right to nominate directors, and all of the other shareholders agree to vote their 
shares for the selected nominees. 1 ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 4:12 (Rev. 3d ed. 2014).  In each case, directors are elected to represent the body of 
shareholders and not merely those who nominated or elected them.  See, e.g., Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. 
Corp., No. 8626.VCL, 2013 WL 5967028, at *12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 2013) (“Delaware decisions con-
sistently reject the related concept of ‘constituency directors’ as well as the notion that a director ap-
pointed by a particular minority stockholder or a particular class or series of stock can or should serve 
the particular interests of the appointing entity.”); see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Gug-
lielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Direc-
tors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 771–72 (2008) (presuming the directors’ fiduciary duties to all stockholders 
trump contract law expectations by specific constituencies, but acknowledging that “so long as the 
constituency directors’ representative capacity is transparently disclosed to stockholders and fellow 
directors, constituency directors could be permitted to advocate the interests of their sponsors”). 
58 NBA Constitution, supra note 1, at art. 18(b). 
59 See id. 
60 Id.  
61 See id. at art. 18(b), Interpretation, Definition of “Governor” (a)(6). 
62 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
63 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all Governors . . . .”64  This is unlike the corporate 
context, where the board of directors does not have the power to remove any 
other director.65  In the case of corporations, only shareholders have the power 
to remove directors.66  This power also envisions the governors acting as agents 
of the team-owners, rather than solely as members of a governing body. 
In addition to being charged with general oversight over the NBA, the board 
of governors has many other governance rights under the NBA Constitution.  
For example, a vote of the board of governors is needed to add a new member 
to the NBA;67 to approve of any transfer by a member of that person’s member-
ship interest;68 to expel a member where circumstances warrant expulsion;69 to 
require the members to contribute more capital than the annual amount specified 
in the NBA Constitution;70 to amend the Bylaws;71 to approve any unusual ex-
penses by the Commissioner;72 to elect the Commissioner;73 and to remove the 
Commissioner.74  With such broad powers, there is no doubt that the board of 
governors largely controls the NBA, even though the board delegates day-to-
day management responsibilities to the Commissioner.75 
Under the NBA Constitution, the Commissioner is the “Chief Executive 
Officer of the League and [is] charged with protecting the integrity of the game 
of professional basketball and preserving public confidence in the League.”76  
Moreover, the Commissioner is charged with resolving disputes among mem-
bers and addressing any wrongdoing by members.77  Generally, the Commis-
sioner’s remedial power in the case of member wrongdoing is to suspend the 
member, or impose fines or penalties.78 
                                                          
64 NBA Constitution, supra note 1, art. 18(d). 
65 E.W.H., Annotation, Power of Directors of Private Corporation to Remove Officers or Fellow 
Directors, 63 A.L.R. FED, 776, at 14 (1929). 
66 14A  N.Y. JUR. 2D BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 572 (2009). 
67 NBA Constitution, supra note 1, art. 4(d). 
68 Id. at art. 5(f). 
69 Id. at arts. 13, 14(f) & (g). 
70 Id. at art. 32. 
71 Id. at art. 17(a). 
72 Id. at art. 24(g). 
73 Id. at art. 24(a). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at art. 24(c). 
76 Id. at art. 24(a). 
77 See id. at arts. 24(d)–(e). 
78 See id. at arts. 24(i), (j), & (l). 
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Here, the Commissioner functions like a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
a business corporation.  However, in a corporation, a CEO does not have the 
discretion to suspend or fine a shareholder for misconduct.79  As such, the Com-
missioner has more power over shareholders than a CEO in a corporation. 
Neither the NBA Constitution nor the Bylaws contains a choice of law pro-
vision.  On the other hand, in the only provision that refers to a governing law—
the provision on dissolution—the NBA Constitution contains a New York 
choice of law provision.80  The NBA’s corporate office and headquarters are 
also in New York.81 
III. POSSIBLE LEGAL CATEGORIZATIONS OF THE NBA 
There are two potential theories for the state law structure of the NBA, 
which, as mentioned above, has not been organized as a corporation, limited 
liability company, or limited partnership—juridical entities formed upon the 
making of a filing with a secretary of state.  First, the NBA is arguably a part-
nership, as an association of team owners operating a basketball league for 
profit.  Alternatively, it is arguably a NUA, or an association of team owners 
operating a basketball league not for profit.  If the NBA does not fit under either 
of these categories, then it is solely a contract among the team-owners.  In fact, 
many contractual relationships exist without creating separate legal entities.  On 
the other hand, a contractual relationship can also be a legally cognizable or-
ganization. 
Which of these organizational structures applies to the NBA, if any, deter-
mines the duties and default rules that apply to the NBA members and manag-
ers.  For instance, if the NBA is a partnership, then the team owners—the part-
ners in the organization—would owe fiduciary duties to their fellow partners.82  
Moreover, there would be a set of default rules to govern the team members’ 
relationships, including the expulsion of a member.83  These same rules would 
apply in some jurisdictions if the NBA were a NUA.  If, on the other hand, the 
                                                          
79 Shareholders sometimes do agree with other shareholders that specified events trigger a buy-out 
right of a fellow shareholder.  See Doniger v. Rye Psychiatric Hosp. Ctr. Inc., 122 A.D.2d 873, 875 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986).  However, the CEO is not usually given the discretion to exercise that right. 
80 NBA Constitution, supra note 1, at art. 16. 
81 FAN RELATIONS FAQ, NBA, http://www.nba.com/help/fan_relations_faq.html#fanfaq14 (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2014); NBA CORPORATE OFFICE AND HEADQUARTERS, CORPORATEOFFICE, 
http://www.corporateoffice.com/NBA.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
82 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
83 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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NBA is not one of these legally cognizable entities, then the NBA Constitution 
and Bylaws, along with principles of contract law, would govern the relation-
ships by and among members and managers. 
Each of these alternative legal structures is discussed next.  First, Section A 
discusses what a contractual relationship is, as that is the default structure that 
applies if the NBA is neither a partnership nor a NUA.  Next, Section B explores 
what a partnership is.  Section C then considers what a NUA is.  Part IV analyzes 
the NBA under these principles. 
A. Contract 
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties that creates obliga-
tions that are enforceable.84  The parties themselves bargain for the obligation 
or obligations to be enforced.85 
The concept of enforcement refers to the availability of a remedy for a 
breach of the agreed-upon obligation.86  There are many defenses to enforce-
ment.  For example, a court will not enforce a contract, or a contractual term, 
that violates public policy.87  Absent one of these defenses, a court will provide 
a remedy for a party’s failure to perform its agreed-on obligation. 
Thus, the crux of a contract is that the parties have privately bargained for 
a set of obligations and rights.  By and large, contract law does not impose rights 
and obligations on the parties; rather, it is the parties who specifically bargain 
for those rights and obligations.  Yet, contract law does imply some obligations.  
Importantly, each party has an implied obligation to act in accordance with good 
faith and fair dealing.88  That obligation requires that neither party seek to un-
dermine the benefits the other party was expecting under the contract.89 
In some contexts, the common law of contracts overlaps with a separate 
legal scheme that governs the relationship created through the contract.  The 
extent of that overlap depends on the nature of the contract. 
                                                          
84 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 590 (1819). 
85 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2007). 
86 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979). 
87 See id. at ch. 8 Introductory Note. 
88 See id. at § 205; see also Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc. v. Neisloss, 8 A.D.2d 965, 965 (1959), aff’d 
mem. 167 N.E.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. 1960). 
89 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
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For example, a transaction in goods falls under article two of a state’s uni-
form commercial code (UCC).90  UCC article two contains some mandatory 
terms.  For example, section 2-201 requires contracts for the sale of goods for 
the price of $1,000 or more to be in writing to be enforceable.91  The UCC also 
sets out some default terms, or contractual terms that apply, unless the parties 
otherwise agree.  For example, section 2-305 implies a reasonable price if par-
ties have concluded a contract for the sale of goods and not specified a price.92  
This section does not have any applicability if the parties have agreed on a price, 
thereby contracting around this default term.  Moreover, the common law of 
contracts still applies to transactions in goods where article two does not apply.93  
Thus, despite the existence of a separate statutory scheme for transactions in 
goods, the common law of contracts remains applicable. 
Many contracts contain choice-of-law provisions.  That is, they select the 
law that applies to those contracts.  Because contract law is a matter of private 
bargain, courts generally respect those choice-of-law provisions unless they vi-
olate a policy in the enforcing court’s jurisdiction.94  On the other hand, a 
choice-of-law provision is not necessary to make a contract binding.  Where a 
contract does not contain such a provision, a court will apply the law of the state 
with the closest ties to the transaction.95 
B. Partnership/Joint-Venture 
Partnership law is another area of law that overlaps with contract law.  The 
overlap arises because partners enter into contracts between themselves to set 
out the terms of their partnership.96  Yet, partners need not enter into an express 
contract to form a partnership.97  Rather, a partnership exists where two or more 
persons carry on as co-owners a business for profit.98  That is true even where 
                                                          
90 See Uniform Commercial Code § 2–102 (2002) [hereinafter UCC]; accord New York Uniform 
Commercial Code Law § 2–102 (2014) [hereinafter N.Y. UCC]. 
91 See UCC, supra note 90, at § 2–201; accord N.Y. UCC, supra note 90, at § 2–201. 
92 See UCC, supra note 90, at § 2–305; accord N.Y. UCC, supra note 90, at § 2–305. 
93 UCC, supra note 90, at § 1–103; accord N.Y. UCC, supra note 90, at § 1–103. 
94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). 
95 Id. at § 294. 
96 15A N.Y. JUR. 2D BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 1558 (2009). 
97 See Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 202(a) (1997) [hereinafter RUPA]; J. WILLIAM CALLISON 
& MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS § 5.7 (2013). 
98 See RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202(a); accord New York Partnership Law § 10 (1999) [hereinafter 
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parties do not specifically intend to form a partnership, or where they legally 
categorize their relationship as something other than a partnership.99  It is also 
true where the business does not actually generate a profit, so long as the profit 
motive is present.100 
By focusing on business profits, a partnership must clearly be tied to the 
pursuit of commercial activity.101  In fact, just sharing profits leads to a pre-
sumption that parties have formed a partnership.102  It is then up to a party dis-
puting the existence of a partnership to show that the relationship is something 
other than a partnership.103 
There are many justifications for partnership law.  Importantly, in a partner-
ship, partners direct their acts toward a collective business purpose—that is, to-
ward a commercial goal or goals.  Moreover, each partner can individually act 
toward that purpose, thereby binding the collective.104  Partnership law imposes 
obligations on the parties to hold them to that common purpose.105  Importantly, 
it sets out fiduciary duties that partners owe to one another.106  As was famously 
proclaimed by Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals in Meinhard 
v. Salmon in the context of a partnership constituting a joint-venture, “[j]oint 
adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, 
the duty of finest loyalty.”107  The duty of loyalty requires partners to act in the 
best interest of the partnership and refrain from acting in their own personal 
interest.108  Partners also owe a duty of care, which generally requires partners 
                                                          
N.Y. P’Ship]. 
99 See RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202(a) & (c); CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 97, at § 5.7. 
100 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 97, at § 5.10. 
101 LAURA HUNTER DIETZ ET AL., AM. JUR. § 1 (2d ed. 2014) (“A partnership exists only in a busi-
ness or commercial setting”). 
102 See RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202(c)(3); accord N.Y. P’Ship, supra note 98, at § 11.4. 
103 See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 97, at § 5.17. 
104 See id. at § 1.1 (noting that partnership law is closely tied to agency law “because each partner 
is an agent for the other partners and for the partnership business”). 
105 See id. 
106 See N.Y. P’Ship, supra note 98, at § 43; see also Terra Venture v. JDN Real Estate–Overland 
Park, L.P., 443 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2006); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); 
Lightsey v. Marshall, 992 P.2d 904, 908 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); Silverstein v. Last, 383 A.2d 718, 721 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). Where there is a managing partner or co-venturer, courts have im-
posed the fiduciary duty on the managing venturer.  See, e.g., Indep. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Zanger, 538 
F. Supp. 2d 704, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
107 Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546. 
108 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 97, at § 12.4. 
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to make business decisions in good faith.109  Such fiduciary duties arise because 
of the trust and confidence placed in, and accepted by, the partners to manage 
the association.110 
Partnership law, for the most part, only sets out default terms of the partner 
relationship—that is, terms that apply unless the parties otherwise agree.111  
Such default terms reflect the largely contractual nature of the partnership rela-
tionship.112  Yet, where parties fail to specify all of the terms governing their 
relationship—a relationship that may continue into the distant and unforeseea-
ble future—partnership law creates a set of default terms to govern that relation-
ship. 
Still, there are some mandatory aspects of partnership law.  For instance, 
under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), partners may not eliminate 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty.113  Instead, they can only modify that duty in lim-
ited ways if not manifestly unreasonable.114  Moreover, partners cannot unrea-
sonably reduce the duty of care.115  These mandatory provisions recognize that 
partners individually have discretion to commit the collective enterprise.116  
Thus, there is a need to control that discretion.117  In other words, the mere status 
of being a partner justifies imposing a minimal mandatory duty. 
Not all states restrict partners’ power to eliminate fiduciary duties.  For ex-
ample, New York’s partnership law does not contain such a statutory restriction.  
Consistently, New York case law permits contractual parties broad freedom to 
modify, even eliminate, fiduciary duties.118 
As another example of a mandatory aspect of partnership law, under RUPA, 
parties may not modify the right of a court to expel a partner due to that partner’s 
                                                          
109 Id. at § 12.2. 
110 See id. 
111 See RUPA, supra note 97, at Prefatory Note. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. at § 103(b)(3). 
114 See id. at § 103(b)(3)(i). 
115 See id. at § 103(b)(4). 
116 See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligations, 5 DUKE L.J. 
879, 908–09 (1988). 
117 See id. at 909–10. 
118 See BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 866 F. Supp. 2d 257, 269–70 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (stating that fiduciary duty waivers are effective in New York and citing numerous cases that 
stand for this proposition).  
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misconduct, breach of duty, or where that partner makes it not reasonably prac-
ticable to carry on business with that partner.119  This mandatory judicial right 
of expulsion acknowledges the vulnerability of a partner to a fellow partner’s 
discretion in binding the partnership.  Given this vulnerability, it protects a part-
ner’s right to ask a court to expel another partner who is engaging in wrongdo-
ing. 
Here, New York partnership law does not have a default expulsion right.120  
Rather, New York law gives each partner a right to seek a judicial decree of 
dissolution due to a fellow partner’s misconduct.121  In New York, a partner may 
request dissolution of a partnership where a partner is “guilty of such conduct 
as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business.”122  Alternatively, 
a court may decree dissolution where a partner willfully or persistently breaches 
the partnership agreement or “conducts himself in matters relating to the part-
nership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in 
partnership with him.”123  Where a New York partnership is dissolved due to a 
partner’s wrongful conduct, the remaining partners can elect to continue the 
partnership in the same name.124  Because of this right to continue with the part-
nership business, dissolution due to a partner’s misconduct followed by a con-
tinuation of the partnership by the other partners has substantially the same ef-
fect as an expulsion. 
Unlike RUPA, New York’s partnership statute does not remove the part-
ners’ ability to modify a partner’s right to seek judicial dissolution due to a fel-
low partner’s misconduct.125  In fact, one New York court has held that partners 
can eliminate this right to seek judicial dissolution so long as they do so specif-
ically and unequivocally.126 
                                                          
119 RUPA, supra note 97, at § 103(b)(7). 
120 Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
121 See N.Y. P’Ship, supra note 98, at §§ 62, 63.  While New York partnership law follows tradi-
tional partnership law in providing for dissolution rather than expulsion, in circumstances of judicial 
dissolution due to partners wrongdoing, it allows the continuing partners to continue the partnership 
rather than liquidate.  Id. at § 69(2)(b).  As such, there is not much difference between an expulsion and 
dissolution due to partner wrongdoing. 
122 Id. at § 63(c). 
123 Id. at § 63(d). 
124 Id. at § 69(2)(b). 
125 See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 95 CIV.5575 (KMW), 1996 WL 
340002, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1996). 
126 See id. (holding that parties to a partnership agreement have the right to contract around nearly 
any provision of partnership law, even the right to seek a judicial dissolution, but noting that the waiver 
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A relationship may be a partnership even where partners limit the purpose 
of the business to a specific purpose.  In that context, the partnership is referred 
to as a “joint venture.” 127  Partnership law largely applies to that joint venture 
in the same way that it applies to partnerships with broader purposes.128 
State law governs the terms of a partnership.129  Partners can, and often do, 
select which state’s laws apply to that partnership.130  Courts will generally re-
spect that choice unless it violates public policy.131  Where partners do not des-
ignate a choice of law for a partnership, courts will apply the law of the state 
with the most ties,132 which usually means the state of either the partnership’s 
principal place of business or its chief executive office.133 
C. Nonprofit Unincorporated Association (NUA) 
NUAs are similar to partnerships in that they are formed by people who join 
together to achieve a common objective.134  The primary difference is that the 
participants in an NUA, in pursuing a common objective, do not seek profits.135 
The legal regime that applies to an NUA, as with a partnership, is deter-
mined by state law.  However, states usually take one of two approaches to the 
regulation of these entities.  Some states have adopted legislation to regulate 
                                                          
must be specific and unequivocal). 
127 See RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202 cmt. 31 (“Relationships that are called ‘joint ventures' are 
partnerships if they otherwise fit the definition of a partnership.”). See also Terra Venture, Inc. v. JDN 
Real Estate–Overland Park, L.P., 443 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (“‘When the 
relationship of joint adventurers exists, the parties stand in a close relationship of trust and confidence 
and are bound by the same standards of good conduct and square dealing as are required of partners. 
’”). 
128 See, e.g., supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202 cmt. 
2. 
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 294 (1971). 
130 See id. at § 294 cmt. (b). 
131 See id. at § 187. 
132 Id. at § 294  
133 See RUPA, supra note 97, at §106(b), §106(b) cmt. (providing for a governing law tied to the 
partnership’s chief executive office); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 294 cmt. (d) 
(1971) (noting that the jurisdiction with the most ties is usually where the partnership does all or sub-
stantially all of its business under its agreement, if such a place exists). 
134 REVISED UNIFORM UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION ACT § 2(8) (2008) [hereinafter 
RUUNAA] available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Unincorporated%20Non-
profit%20Association%20Act%20%281992%29%281996%29.  
135 See id. at § 2(8) cmt. 8 (requiring that members join together to pursue one or more common, 
nonprofit purposes).  
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NUAs.  For instance, five states have adopted statutes based on the Revised 
Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (RUUNAA) drafted and 
promoted by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).136  Moreover, ten states 
have adopted statutes based on the RUUNAA’s predecessor, the Uniform Non-
profit Association Act.137  In contrast, other states regulate NUAs through a 
patchwork of common law and statutes that govern limited aspects of their op-
eration.138  
Those common law regimes often view NUAs as amalgams of their mem-
bers rather than separate legal entities.139  As such, there is no separate legal 
entity, either to bind to contracts, or to sue or be sued.140  In essence, these enti-
ties are not entities at all, but solely contractual relationships. 
New York is an example of a jurisdiction that does not statutorily recognize 
NUAs.  Rather, they are regulated through the common law.141  As such, NUAs 
are primarily treated as contracts and are not considered to be legal entities sep-
arate from their members.142 
Here, again, which state’s laws apply depends on the selected governing 
                                                          
136 See generally UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION ACT 
(2008), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Unincorporated%20Non-
profit%20Association%20Act%20%282008%29.  
137 See generally id.  This number was derived by counting the states that the ULC shows as having 
adopted its original uniform unincorporated nonprofit association act (twelve), and subtracting out the 
two states (Arkansas and D.C.) that adopted the later Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association 
Act.  
138 RUUNAA, supra note 134, at Prefatory Note.  Even in states where unincorporated associations 
are regulated by the common law, some types of nonprofit associations are regulated, such as unions 
and churches.  See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. § 201 (2011). 
139 RUUNAA, supra note 134, at Prefatory Note. 
140 See 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 35:72 (4th ed. 2012) (stating that apart from states that 
statutorily recognize NUAs’ power to enter into contracts and to sue and be sued, “the majority rule 
appears to be to the effect that a statute that permits an unincorporated association merely to sue or be 
sued in its association name does not change the legal status of the association so as to render it liable 
on contracts entered into in the association name.”). 
141 People v. Norwegian Underwriters, 247 N.Y.S. 707, 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931) (“Unincorporated 
associations are mere creatures of contract freely formed at common law without any grant from the 
sovereign.”).  For a sample of some New York statutory provisions applicable to nonprofit associations, 
see N.Y. GEN. ASS’N § 12 (2009–2014) (empowering the nonprofit association to sue and be sued); 
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS §§ 53–57 (2014) (requiring nonexempt nonprofit associations with twenty members 
or more that require members to submit an oath as a condition to membership to submit a copy of that 
oath along with other documents to the secretary of state). 
142 Martin v. Curran, 101 N.E.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951); L&L Assocs. Holding Corp. v. 
Charity United Baptist Church, 935 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
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law in the associated parties’ contract.143  Failing that, as with all contracts, a 
court will apply the law with the most ties to the transaction.144  RUUNAA spec-
ifies that in that case, the governing law is the law of the state where the associ-
ation has its “main place of activities . . . .”145  RUUNAA uses this standard 
rather than an NUA’s chief executive office to determine the governing law be-
cause many NUAs are informal and do not have executive offices.146  To the 
extent a nonprofit is multijurisdictional, RUUNAA contemplates that the mem-
bers will specify which state’s laws govern.147 
IV. WHAT IS THE NBA? 
This Part tackles the question of how to characterize the NBA for state or-
ganization law purposes.  First, Section A analyzes whether the NBA’s organi-
zational form is dictated by judicial opinions decided under antitrust law.  As 
that discussion explains, judicial opinions drawing conclusions about the 
NBA’s structure for purposes of antitrust law are not conclusive for purposes of 
state business organization law.  Next, Section B analyzes which state’s laws to 
look to in determining what legal framework applies to the NBA’s organization.  
As that discussion explains, New York law applies no matter whether the NBA 
is a partnership, an NUA, or a contract.  Next, Section C explains why the NBA 
is likely a partnership governed by New York partnership law.  Alternatively, it 
contemplates that the NBA is an NUA under New York law.  Part V then ad-
dresses several key consequences that flow from that conclusion. 
A. NBA Structure Under Antitrust Law 
Some courts have described the NBA as a joint venture.  For example, in 
National Basketball Ass’n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc.,148 the Ninth Circuit 
described the NBA as a New York joint venture.149  On the other hand, the 
NBA’s structure was not at issue in SDC Basketball Club.  As such, it is not 
clear how the court concluded that the NBA was a joint venture, or whether it 
viewed the NBA as a joint venture for purposes of state organization laws. 
                                                          
143 See RUUNAA, supra note 134, at § 4(b). 
144 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
145 See RUUNAA, supra note 134, at § 4 (b). 
146 See id. at § 4 cmt. 2. 
147 Id. 
148 See generally Nat'l Basketball Ass'n. v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987). 
149 Id. at 564. 
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The NBA’s structure was an issue in Chicago Professional Sports L.P. v. 
National Basketball Association, referred to as Chicago Bulls II.150  In Chicago 
Bulls II, the chief issues were whether the NBA could cap the number of games 
for which a NBA team could grant a national broadcast right, and whether the 
NBA could charge a “broadcast fee” on team-licensed national broadcasts with-
out running afoul of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.151  Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act precludes contracts among two or more distinct business entities in restraint 
of trade.152  Except for certain activities that are per se unlawful, to violate sec-
tion one of the Sherman Act, the restraint on trade must be unreasonable.153  
However, as has been traditionally analyzed, Section 1 of the Sherman Act does 
not apply to single firms, as a single firm cannot collude with itself in restraint 
of trade.154  Indeed, participants in a single firm are expected to cooperate.155  
On this point, while the Seventh Circuit remanded the issue of whether the 
NBA was a single entity for purposes of the Sherman Act, the court held that 
whether the NBA looks like one firm depends on the perspective from which 
the inquiry is conducted.156  However, “when acting in the broadcast market the 
NBA is closer to a single firm than to a group of independent firms.”157 
In 2010, the Supreme Court heard a similar antitrust challenge against the 
National Football League (NFL) in American Needle Inc. v. National Football 
League.158 In that case, American Needle challenged the right of the NFL teams 
to agree to grant an exclusive license to produce and sell trademarked headgear 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.159  The Supreme Court focused its inquiry 
not on whether the NFL was a single entity or a joint venture, as had the Seventh 
Circuit in Chicago Bulls II.160  In fact, the Court eschewed an analysis tied to 
organizational form.161  Rather, it focused on whether the NFL teams had joined 
                                                          
150 Chi. Prof’l Sports L.P. v. Nat'l. Basketball Ass'n., 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996). 
151 Id at 595. 
152 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006). 
153 See Bd. of Trade City of Chi. v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  For a critique of the rule of 
reason, see Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S. 
Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 603 (2012). 
154 Chi. Prof’l Sports L.P., 95 F.3d at 599. 
155 Id. at 598. 
156 See id. at 600. 
157 Id. at 600; see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911). 
158 See generally Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
159 Id. at 187.  
160 Id. at 191–92. 
161 See id. 
GROSSMAN FINAL FORMATTED 1/23/2015  11:20 AM 
122 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 25:1 
 
 
 
together separate decision-makers in concerted action such that the marketplace 
was deprived of a diversity of entrepreneurial interests and, thus, actual or po-
tential competition.162  If so, the NFL teams remained subject to scrutiny under 
section one of the Sherman Act.163  Otherwise, the teams’ grants of the exclusive 
license was not subject to review under that section.164 
The Court ultimately found that the thirty-two NFL teams were in fact sep-
arate, profit-maximizing entities with separate interests in licensing team trade-
marks.165  As such, the plaintiff could challenge the NFL’s action under Section 
1 of the Sherman Act.166  While American Needle involved the NFL, its reason-
ing behind whether a contract deprives the marketplace of independent centers 
of decision-making within a single sports league could apply to other similarly 
structured professional sports leagues, including the NBA.167 
There are several reasons why conclusions about the NBA’s organizational 
form made in the context of an antitrust law challenge should not control such 
an inquiry for purposes of state law.  To begin, the different organizational op-
tions typically considered in the antitrust context are different than in the state 
organization law context.  For example, the court in Chicago Bulls II limited 
itself to two organizational options—a single entity or a joint venture.168  In state 
organization law, it is not clear what “single entity” means, for all organizational 
forms are treated as single entities; that is true of partnerships, limited partner-
ships, limited liability companies, and corporations.  Moreover, the term “joint 
venture” alone does not indicate what organizational form that joint venture has 
taken.  By default, a joint venture is a partnership,169 but the parties could have 
formed it in some other organizational form.  Not only do courts in these anti-
trust cases not focus on these different organizational forms, but their inquiry 
into whether an entity is a joint venture does not even comport with the joint 
venture test under state organization law.170 
                                                          
162 Id. at 191–95. 
163 Id. at 191–92. 
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165 Id. at 196–97. 
166 Id. 
167 For a discussion of how Chicago Bulls II reconciles with American Needle, see Herbert 
Hovencamp, American Needle and the Boundaries of the Firm in Antitrust Law 18-19 (Working Paper, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616625. 
168 Chi. Prof’l Sports L.P. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996). 
169 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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In addition, the goals of the federal antitrust law regime and the state organ-
izational law regime are different.  Antitrust law, on the one hand, seeks to pro-
tect consumers by preserving competition.171  Thus, the focus of the inquiry is 
on whether various market participants acted anti-competitively toward con-
sumers.172  State organization law, on the other hand, focuses on ensuring man-
agers act faithfully to achieve the business purpose.173  Moreover, it seeks to 
impose default terms to govern the associated parties’ on-going relationship ab-
sent agreement to the contrary.174  Thus, organization law shifts the focus away 
from consumers and toward the owners and managers of the business; away 
from protecting the public from harm and toward creating a functional, long-
term business relationship.  These different policy rationales justify conducting 
separate inquiries into the NBA’s organizational structure under state organiza-
tional law from that conducted under federal antitrust law.  Thus, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in American Needle, state organizational form does not affect 
the inquiry into a violation of federal antitrust laws.175  The opposite is true, as 
well; conclusions about businesses drawn for purposes of federal antitrust law 
do not control the state organization law analysis. 
Case law is not alone in ignoring the NBA’s organizational structure outside 
of the antitrust realm; academic commentary, too, fails to discuss the NBA’s 
structure under state organization law.176  The dearth of such discussions further 
emphasizes the void in the literature about the NBA’s structure under state or-
ganization law. 
B. Governing Law: New York 
Before analyzing the NBA’s legal categorization under state law, it must 
first be determined which state’s laws govern the inquiry.  Here, the NBA’s 
Constitution does not select a governing law.  Thus, the governing law must be 
determined by application of conflict-of-law principles. 
Regardless of whether the NBA is partnership, NUA, or solely a contract, 
                                                          
171 See Babette Boliek, Antitrust, Regulation, and the “New” Rules of Sports Telecasts, 65 
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the inquiry seems fairly clear: New York law governs.  To refresh, if the NBA 
is a partnership, the applicable law is the law of the jurisdiction of its chief ex-
ecutive office.177  Because the NBA’s corporate office and headquarters are in 
New York,178 New York law governs.  If the NBA is an NUA, the applicable 
law is the law in which the NBA conducts the majority of its affairs.179 That 
again is New York, given the location of the NBA’s corporate office and head-
quarters in New York.180  Finally, even if the NBA is solely a contractual rela-
tionship among its members, New York law governs.  That is because New 
York is the state with the most ties to the transaction given that the NBA’s cor-
porate office and headquarter are in New York. 
C. NBA as a Partnership or NUA 
The NBA has not been formed as a limited partnership, limited liability 
company, or corporation.  To form as one of these legal entities, the NBA would 
have had to file an instrument of formation with the Secretary of State in the 
state of organization.  Without one of these filings, the only potential organiza-
tional forms applicable to the NBA are a partnership and NUA.  
An analysis of whether the NBA is a partnership or NUA, as compared to a 
contract, must begin with whether the NBA team-owners have associated to 
pursue one or more joint objectives.  If they have, then either partnership or 
NUA law applies.  Otherwise, contract law will govern that relationship without 
application of partnership or NUA law. 
In the case of the NBA, it is clear that the team-owners have associated to 
pursue at least one common objective—to operate a professional basketball 
league. The nature of this association allows them to coordinate regular and 
playoff game days and times; game rules; dispute resolution procedures; the 
election of a manager (Commissioner); and the addition of new teams; among 
other things.  The existence of a management structure similar to that used in 
business corporations also reflects the level of cooperation needed—and 
achieved—to operate a unified professional basketball league.  The court in 
American Needle even recognized the need for this kind of cooperation to oper-
ate a professional sports league.181  Thus, it is clear the NBA is an association, 
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at least for purposes of operating a professional basketball league. 
Whether the NBA is a partnership or NUA depends on the nature of that 
association.  In the case of the NBA, the association is arguably not to pursue a 
commercial objective.  A business is a commercial endeavor.182  Here, the team 
members have associated in creating these league rules to avoid utter chaos on 
the court and in the operation of the league.  That, in turn, allows the members 
to operate a unified basketball league.  Thus, they are arguably not employed to 
pursue a joint profit-seeking business. 
However, the more likely view is that the team members have associated to 
create these league rules not merely to further the social cause of operating a 
professional basketball league, but to maximize the collective revenues of the 
entire league.  Part of this conclusion stems from the nature of NBA team reve-
nue-sharing.  Again, under the CBA, teams share in any excess taxes paid by 
teams that have exceeded the annual salary cap.183  Teams also share merchan-
dising and broadcast revenues from contracts that the board of governors au-
thorizes the Commissioner to enter into on behalf of the league.184 In other 
words, teams, through their collectively-appointed managers, are leveraging the 
team-owners’ joint assets—the right to collect merchandising revenues from the 
licensing of the teams’ collective marks and the right to collect broadcast reve-
nues from the licensing of all NBA team games—to maximize revenues for the 
league and, in turn, for the team-owners.  In fact, the equal sharing of those 
revenues tracks the default partnership rules on equal sharing of profits among 
partners.185  Clearly, this monetization of collective rights to intellectual prop-
erty is not necessary to operate an effective professional basketball league.  Ra-
ther, it is clearly designed to financially benefit the NBA member teams. 
The NBA might respond that profit-sharing is not intended to be a partner-
ship; rather, it is intended to be a method to equalize revenues among teams to 
ensure the league operates effectively.  In other words, the purpose for the shar-
ing of profits is to further the social purpose of ensuring the survival of a pro-
fessional basketball league.  
However, the sharing of those revenues in conjunction with the association 
of team-owners at least raises a presumption of partnership.186  It would then 
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fall to the NBA to prove that no partnership was intended.187 
The NBA might also respond that operating a professional basketball league 
is not a profit-seeking venture, but a social venture.  Yet, even if one were to 
acknowledge that team owners derive much social value from operating a func-
tional professional basketball league, partnership law does not exclude these 
types of social motivations from its scope.  Entrepreneurs involved with closely 
held businesses often make business decisions on the basis of emotion.188  That, 
however, does not prevent the existence of a for-profit motive.  It simply means 
that the individuals are getting personal satisfaction out of their joint investment. 
If the NBA is not a partnership because the joint profit-motive of the NBA, 
teams cannot be established; then the NBA is an NUA under New York law.  
That is because it remains an association of team-owners, even if they do not 
jointly pursue a business profit.  While in some jurisdictions this leads to the 
imposition on the members of rights and duties similar to those under partner-
ship law,189 in New York, the laws governing NUAs are essentially the laws of 
contracts.190  In other words, there would be no default rights of NBA team 
members, and no default duties of those team members.  As such, the NBA 
Constitution and Bylaws, along with other contracts among members, would set 
out the terms of the association by and among the members.191 
V. CONCLUSION: CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL CATEGORIZATION OF THE NBA 
While courts and commentators have given substantial treatment to the 
NBA’s structure, those discussions have not focused on the NBA’s structure for 
purposes of state organization law.  As I have argued above, it is important to 
identify what organizational form applies to the NBA given the consequences 
that could flow from such structure.  As I have also argued above, the NBA may 
be a partnership, even though there is some basis to conclude it is a NUA. 
There are numerous consequences that would flow from the NBA’s catego-
rization as a partnership.  Importantly, each member would owe a fiduciary duty 
to the other members.  That means each member would have a duty to act with 
                                                          
187 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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190 See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
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the requisite degree of care in making partnership decisions.192  Moreover, each 
member would have a duty to act loyally, in the best interest of the NBA, and 
not in the member’s own self-interest.193   
In the case of Donald Sterling, he would have breached his duty of care by 
carelessly making remarks that could injure the league’s reputation and the 
NBA’s collective brand. He would have also breached his duty of loyalty by 
uttering remarks opposed to the best interests of the NBA and its players, and 
their desire to maximize league revenues. 
Here, the members have not eliminated these fiduciary duties in the NBA 
Constitution. While the NBA Constitution does address conflicts of interest,194 
that provision does not state that it sets out the exclusive scope of fiduciary du-
ties.  Admittedly, the NBA Constitution does not contain such a provision be-
cause the NBA does not appear to view itself as a partnership.  As such, no 
waiver is supposed to be necessary.  However, as I argued in Part IV above, it 
is entirely plausible that the NBA is a partnership.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the intricacies of how these 
fiduciary duties would apply to the NBA’s members.  That analysis might be 
especially tricky given that the members also seek to maximize profits from 
their individually-owned teams. On the other hand, courts in business organiza-
tion law regularly resolve disputes among business owners who operate com-
peting firms.195 
One of the other key consequences to finding the NBA is a partnership is 
that any member could seek judicial dissolution due to a fellow partner’s mis-
conduct.196  The other partners could then choose to continue with the partner-
ship, effectively leading to an outcome similar to an expulsion.197  This is true 
under New York law, which would govern, as New York allows partners to 
waive the right to seek judicial dissolution.198  Without such a waiver in the 
NBA Constitution, presumably any member could exert this right.  
This right could have been useful as pressure mounted on the NBA mem-
bers to expel Donald Sterling after he made racist remarks.  Instead of wringing 
their hands and wondering whether the NBA Constitution afforded them the 
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right to expel Sterling and, if so, whether they could garner enough votes to do 
so, any member could have petitioned a court to dissolve due to Sterling’s mis-
conduct.  The grounds likely would have been that Sterling was “guilty of such 
conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business.”199  Al-
ternatively, arguably Sterling either breached the partnership agreement by ut-
tering a racist remark to the extent justifying a fine under the NBA Constitution, 
or “conduct[ed] himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him.”200  
Again, the remaining members could then have opted to continue with the part-
nership business after this dissolution, effectively removing Sterling from the 
partnership. 
On the other hand, NBA members might not want other members to have 
this right.  As such, assuming the NBA is a partnership, the partners would re-
move this right in the NBA Constitution.  
While these rights of members would arise in the case of a fellow member’s 
wrongdoing, there are numerous other rights—most of them default—that 
would also arise if the NBA were a New York partnership.  If the members did 
not see a need for these rights and default terms, they could specifically agree 
to eliminate them.201  Absent such an agreement, a member could plausibly seek 
to employ one of the rights provided under state partnership law. 
If, alternatively, the NBA is a New York NUA, then members would not 
owe fiduciary duties or have statutory expulsion rights, as those rights do not 
exist by default under New York NUA law.202  Rather, the terms of the associ-
ation would be contained in the NBA Constitution and Bylaws and any other 
agreements among the members.203  This is likely the state of affairs the NBA 
members expect exists, explaining why no member mentioned that Donald Ster-
ling’s racist remarks breached a fiduciary duty or gave right to a claim of expul-
sion. On the other hand, given the possibility that the NBA is a partnership, if 
the members of the NBA want to avoid the existence of these default rights, 
they should be explicit about that. 
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